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Abstract: We study the selection and dynamics of two popular pricing policiesxed price
and exible pricein competitive markets. Our paper extends previous work in marketing,
e.g. Desai and Purohit (2004) by focusing on decentralized markets with a dynamic and fully
competitive framework while also considering possible non-economic aspects of bargaining. We
construct and analyze a competitive search model which allows us to endogenize the expected
demand depending on pricing rules and posted prices. Our analysis reveals that xed and exible
pricing policies generally coexist in the same marketplace, and each policy comes with its own
list price and customer demographics. More specically, if customers dislike haggling, then xed
pricing emerges as the unique equilibrium, but if customers get some additional satisfaction from
the bargaining process, then both policies are o¤ered, and the unique equilibrium exhibits full
segmentation: Haggler customers avoid xed-price rms and exclusively shop at exible rms
whereas non-haggler customers do the opposite. We also nd that prices increase in customer
satisfaction, implying that sellers take advantage of the positive utility enjoyed by hagglers in
the form of higher prices. Finally, considering the presence of seasonal cycles in most markets,
we analyze a scenario where market demand goes through periodic ups and downs and nd that
equilibrium prices remain mostly stable despite signicant uctuations in demand. This nding
suggests a plausible competition-based explanation for the stability of prices.
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1 Introduction
In a variety of markets, including houses, used cars, boats or jewelry, xed and exible pricing
policies often coexist. While some sellers clearly indicate that they are exible and open to bar-
gaining (e.g., a homeowner putting OBO (or best o¤er) next to the asking price), other sellers
point out xed-prices by using words such as sharp price or no-negotiations. Some popular
used car supermarkets in the UK, such as Cargiant, o¤er only xed prices and leave no room for
negotiation, whereas it is still a common practice to negotiate in most other used-car dealerships.
Similarly, many sellers who are well-known for xed-price selling are reported to allow haggling in
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recent years (Richtel, 2008; Agins and Collins, 2001). Some even go one step further and train their
employees in the art of bargaining with customers (Stout, 2013). In addition, consumers vary in
their bargaining ability and practice in purchasing such items. According to Consumer Reports
recent national survey of American adults on their haggling habits, while a notable portion of indi-
viduals report negotiating when they purchased appliances (39%), jewelry (32%), furniture (43%),
and collectibles and antiques (48%), with 89% of those who haggled obtained discounts at least
once, others simply have not tried bargaining at all (Marks, 2013).
Although the practice of both xed price and exible price policies are widespread, there are
surprisingly few studies in the marketing literature that investigate strategic drivers and implica-
tions of these seemingly contrasting pricing policies (see Desai and Purohit (2004) for an exception).
Our goal in this paper is to understand the dynamics and consequences of xed and exible pric-
ing policies in fully competitive settings. We particularly focus on decentralized markets such as
housing, used cars, boats, or high-end jewelry which exhibit the following characteristics. First,
the majority of these markets operate via search and matching: it takes time and e¤ort to locate
an item or to attract a buyer and depending on the market, a player may have to wait days or
even weeks before he buys or sells. Second, sellers typically have limited inventories (which is the
case in markets for houses, apartments, used cars or boats, where sellers usually possess a single
item, and to a certain extent it is the case in markets for home furniture, jewelry, or antiques);
consequently, there may be signicant trade frictions in that a product available today may not be
available tomorrow. Third, a large number of independent sellers compete with each other in order
to attract customers, and in doing so, they use a range of pricing tools and tactics in an e¤ort to
appeal to customers.
As hinted above, these characteristics are present in a notable proportion of markets for big
ticket items. In addition, markets for other products that may not necessarily be considered as
big-ticket e.g. used product markets for electronics, playstations or bicycles, also broadly exhibit
the aforementioned characteristics, and therefore are relevant to our study context. In contrast, not
all big ticket items demonstrate all the aforementioned traits. For example, markets for some new
large appliances such as high-end big screen TVs often exhibit ample product availability, which
renders our model less suitable for those settings.
A key feature of the markets we study is that bargaining is arguably as prevalent as xed pricing,
especially if conceivable savings from bargaining are not negligible for customers. Customers,
however, are not homogenous in their ability and willingness to negotiate in that some customers
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are willing to exert e¤ort to obtain a discount (hagglers), whereas others are not (non-hagglers).
As such, sellers pricing policies (xed or exible) may have signicant consequences in terms of
the kind of customers they attract or dispel. Also, the process of bargaining may involve additional
psychological dynamics for customers. Specically, haggling may be discomforting and costly due
to additional e¤ort or opportunity cost of time, or due to concerns of being perceived as cheap or
unclassy (Evans and Beltramini, 1987; Pruitt, 2013). On the other hand, in addition to tangible
benets of obtaining a lower price, customers may also get secondary non-economic benets from
the bargaining process such as feelings of enjoyment or excitement.
Our modeling approach is based on a competitive search (directed search) framework which
takes into account the aforementioned characteristicsthat is, we consider a decentralized market
with search frictions where sellers have limited product availability and customers may enjoy or
dislike bargaining. Extending existing work in marketing on xed and exible pricing policies (i.e.,
Desai and Purohit, 2004), our directed search approach allows us to explicitly incorporate full
market competition in a decentralized and dynamic setup, which we believe is the rst study doing
so in the marketing literature.
The model provides several important insights. First, in our benchmark case where customers
are neutral to the bargaining process (i.e. they receive no displeasure or enjoyment from the process
itself), we show that a continuum of search equilibria exist, and in any realized equilibrium, partial
segmentation of customers takes place. Specically, non-haggler customers self-select themselves
into xed-price rms, whereas haggler customers are indi¤erent and may shop anywhere. This
is because exible rms foresee an eventual surplus loss during negotiations, so they strategically
inate the list price. Such inated prices, however, put o¤ non-haggler customers as they cannot
negotiate better deals. Thus, the exible rms end up attracting haggler customers only. Fixed
price rms, on the other hand, announce moderate prices and attract both types of customers.
Second, if customers dislike haggling, then xed pricing emerges as the unique equilibrium. This
is because buyers incur some disutility due to haggling, which, in a competitive setting bleeds into
exible sellers prot functions, and causes them to earn less. As a result, sellers are better o¤ with
xed pricing.
Third, we nd that if customers get some additional pleasure (proxied by a positive ") from
the haggling process, then a unique equilibrium emerges with full segmentation of customers where
hagglers avoid xed-price rms and non-hagglers avoid exible rms. In addition, we show that
the equilibrium list prices increase in "; implying that sellers take advantage of the positive utility
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enjoyed by hagglers in the form of higher prices. Surprisingly, we observe a spillover e¤ect in that
xed price sellers, who do not cater to haggler customers also raise their prices if " goes up.
Finally, taking into account the fact that most markets follow seasonal trends (Radas and
Shugan, 1998), we consider the price dynamics in a long selling period where demand goes through
seasonal ups and downs. An interesting nding is that prices do not uctuate as much as the
demand. This observation provides an interesting insight. In explaining the stability of prices, a
signicant portion of existing literature in marketing highlights price fairness concerns (Xia et al.,
2004; Bolton et al., 2003; Anderson and Simester, 2008) which has its origins in the principle of dual
entitlement put forward by Kahneman et al. (1986). Our model, on the other hand, provides an
additional explanation for price stability that is based on forward looking customers in a competitive
and dynamic market.
2 Model
2.1 Description of the Model
Consider a dynamic market that runs for t = 1; 2; :::; T periods and is populated by a continuum
of heterogeneous buyers and homogeneous sellers. Each seller has one unit of a product that he
is willing to sell above his reservation price, zero, and each buyer wants to purchase one unit and
is willing to pay up to his reservation price, one. Buyers are divided into two groups according to
their bargaining abilities. Low types (non-hagglers) are not skilled in bargaining and never attempt
to negotiate the list price. High types (hagglers) on the other hand are skilled in bargaining and
negotiate the price whenever it is worthwhile to do so. (In the Online Appendix 2 we extend the
model by considering N types.)
The market is decentralized and operates via competitive search. At the beginning of each
period sellers simultaneously and independently announce a list price rm;t 2 [0; 1] and a declaration
m 2 frm (f); best o¤er (b)g indicating whether they are rm with the price or whether they are
exible to accept a counter o¤er. If the seller is rm then the transaction takes place at the list
price. If he is exible then the transaction may involve bargaining, but if the buyer does not wish
to bargain or if two or more buyers are present at the rm then no bargaining takes place and
the item is sold at the initially posted price (more on this below). Before proceeding further, we
should acknowledge that our model implicitly assumes that sellers can commit to a pricing rule and
implement it without incurring any costs. However, in reality sellers may nd it di¢cult to commit
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to a xed price policy, for instance, in markets where bargaining is prevalent and customers insist
upon receiving a deal.
Buyers observe sellers announcements and then choose to visit a seller. It is possible that
multiple customers show up at the same location, so we let n = 0; 1; 2; : : : denote the realized
demand. If n  2 then each buyer has an equal chance 1=n of being selected. If transaction
occurs at price pt then the seller obtains 
t 1pt and the buyer obtains 
t 1 (1  pt) ; where  is the
common discount factor.
The decentralized nature of the market, coupled with sellers limited inventories, creates trade
frictions in that no one is guaranteed of an immediate trade and players may have to try for several
periods before they can actually buy or sell. Indeed, if multiple customers show up at the same
rm, then some of them walk out empty-handed because of the limited inventory. Similarly, due
to the decentralized matching process a seller may well end up with no customer at all. In either
case players need to wait for the subsequent period to try again. Waiting, of course, is costly as
future payo¤s are discounted at rate :1
The market starts with a measure of s1 sellers and b1 buyers, of which a fraction 1 2 (0; 1) are
low types. At the end of each period, players who transact exit the market while the remaining
ones move to the next period to play the same game. Outgoing players may be fully or partially
replaced. Specically, we assume that at the beginning of each period t = 2; 3::: a new cohort of
bnewt buyers and s
new
t sellers enter the market joining the existing players. The measures of buyers
and sellers present in the market at time t, denoted by bt and st; depend on the entering cohorts
as well as the existing players who are yet to trade. (In Section 6 we discuss how bt and st evolve
over time.)
Finally, our model considers possible additional psychological utility (or disutility) associated
with the bargaining experience. In order to examine such non-economic considerations, we introduce
a parameter, "; which can be positive, negative or zero depending on how customers perceive the
bargaining experience and we explore how this parameter a¤ects the selection of equilibrium pricing
rules. The parameter " enters into a buyers utility function as an additive separable term, which
captures the idea that in addition to and independent of the utility derived from the consumption
of the good (proxied by the price of the item), customers derive some additional utility or disutility
from bargaining. This is also consistent with the previous literature in which consumers bargaining
1 In the Online Appendix 2 we explore a variation where unmatched buyers and sellers get to meet for a second
time during the same trading period and show that the results remain robust, upto a modication in outside options.
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cost is incorporated in additive separable form (Rubinstein, 1982; Desai and Purohit, 2004). Finally,
the parameter " is relevant for haggler customers only. It is inapplicable for non-hagglers, as they
always pay the list price due to their lack of bargaining skills.
2.2 Discussion of the Modeling Approach
A number of models in marketing and pricing literatures examine strategic implications of di¤erent
pricing policies, however, most of these studies do not consider competition, and instead focus
on a monopolist seller who receives customers exogenously (Riley and Zeckhauser, 1983; Wang,
1995; Kuo et al., 2011, 2013).2 Other studies incorporate competition using Hotelling or Cournot
frameworks.3 In a closer work to ours, Desai and Purohit (2004) consider a duopoly setting and
use a Hotelling framework to examine the implications of haggling and xed price policy decisions
by two retailers. They show that depending on the parameters, there may exist equilibria in
which both rms choose xed prices, both rms o¤er haggling, or where one rm o¤ers haggling
and the other charges xed prices. An important nding of theirs is that the benets of price
discrimination in a monopoly setting do not necessarily transfer over to a competitive environment.
The Hotelling framework captures competition between (typically two) major retailers without
inventory constraints in an e¤ective way, however our study, which focuses on competition between
a large number of sellers, who have limited inventories and who operate in a market with trade
frictions calls for a di¤erent modeling approach. To that end, our directed search approach is
a natural t in capturing the aforementioned market characteristics and modelling them in an
analytically tractable way.
Our model also di¤ers from the existing directed search models (Eeckhout and Kircher, 2010;
Virag, 2011) with several new features. First, we explicitly incorporate customer heterogeneity
in terms of bargaining skills (hagglers vs. non-hagglers). Second, we introduce a dynamic setup
which enables us to examine strategic implications of xed and exible pricing policies over multiple
2Riley and Zeckhauser (1983) examine a monopolist seller facing risk neutral customers, and suggest that xed
pricing is optimal in comparison to negotiations. This is because while haggling may be advantageous in terms of
price discrimination, the gains from haggling are more than o¤set when buyers refuse purchasing at higher prices.
Wang (1995) creates a dynamic model with a monopolist seller, and concludes that bargaining is preferable if it costs
the same as xed pricing, or if the common costs are high enough. Focusing on operations-related questions in a
monopoly setting, Kuo et al. (2011) characterize the optimal posted price and the resulting negotiation outcome as
a function of inventory and time, and Kuo et al. (2013) focus on pricing policy in a supply chain.
3For instance, Wernerfelt (1994) nds that in a duopoly bargaining may be prot maximizing for sellers as it
helps them avoid the costly Bertrand competition. Using a Hotelling framework, Gill and Thanassoulis (2016) study
strategically chosen stochastic discounts in markets with prior list-price-setting competition. Kuksov (2004) considers
a duopoly model of competition with search costs, and demonstrates that lower search costs may actually result in
higher prices since product di¤erentiation can also increase with decreased search costs.
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periods and in seasonal markets.
As mentioned earlier, our model considers possible non-economic utility (or disutility) associated
with the bargaining experience, proxied by the parameter ". A negative value for " indicates
disutility associated with haggling, which has been highlighted in a number of studies as buyers
bargaining disutility (Morton et al., 2011) or haggling costs (Desai and Purohit, 2004). A negative
" suggests that customers may have the ability to bargain down the list price, but nevertheless,
they may dislike the bargaining process, say, for the fear of being seen as cheap or unclassy, or due
to opportunity cost of time.
A positive " on the other hand, refers to possible non-economic factors such as additional excite-
ment, enjoyment or thrill from the bargaining experience. We must admit, however, that a positive
" does not have a very clear justication, which is a major limitation for the following reasons.
First, the benet or enjoyment of bargaining could be rst and foremost due to the tangible benet
of getting a lower price. While there may exist additional psychological benets of bargaining4
beyond obtaining a lower price, these are likely to be of secondary order for customers. Second,
in our model we treat the positive " as an exogenous parameter, without explicitly accounting for
factors, psychological or otherwise, that may give rise to it. If such factors are explicitly included in
the model, then they may have important interactions with other components of the model, which
we do not consider here. In sum, while our ndings with the positive " are intriguing, one should
take note of these caveats in interpreting the corresponding results.
2.3 Bargaining and the Sale Price
We move backwards in the analysis, starting with the determination of the bargained price in a
meeting. We, then, turn to buyers search decisions and explain how the expected demand at each
rm is pinned down. Finally, we turn to the sellers problem and explore how they select prices
and pricing rules.
The list price at a exible rm may be negotiated if the rm has a single customer. If two
or more customers are present then no bargaining takes place and the item is sold at the posted
price.5 Let  denote the bargaining power of high type buyers relative to the seller. The bargaining
4Bargaining process may possibly provide additional excitement and sensory involvement (Babin et al., 1994), as
well as an additional satisfaction by feeling victorious, proud and smart from obtaining a deal (Holbrook et al., 1984;
Schindler, 1998; Jones et al., 1997). These feelings for bargaining may "transcend the satisfaction of mere economic
gain" (Sherry, 1990)
5The assumption that haggling is possible only if there is a single customer in store (n = 1) is without loss in
generality. One can recast the model where haggling may be possible for n > 1; however this modication does not
add any additional insight.
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power of low types is normalized to zero. Similarly, let uh;t+1 and t+1 denote, respectively, a high
type buyers and a sellers expected payo¤ ("value of search") in period t+ 1: These payo¤s serve
as outside options during negotiations, i.e. in case of disagreement the buyer walks out with payo¤
uh;t+1 and the seller with t+1. The negotiated price, yt, can be found as the solution to the
following maximization problem:
max
yt2[0;1]
(1  yt + "  uh;t+1)
 (yt   t+1)
1  :
The solution yields
yt = 1  uh;t+1    (1  uh;t+1   t+1) + " (1  ) : (1)
The bargained price yt falls with ; i.e. the higher the buyers negotiation skills, the lower the price.
To see why, note that uh;t+1+t+1  1 because the total payo¤ in a transaction cannot exceed the
maximum surplus, one. Therefore the expression 1   (uh;t+1 + t+1) is positive; hence yt falls in
. In addition yt rises with t+1 and falls with uh;t+1 i.e. the stronger the sellers outside option
the higher the price and the stronger the buyers outside option the lower the price. As it turns
out, outside options depend on how competitive the market is expected to be in the next period,
in the period after, and so on. Even though bargaining is bilateral and takes place between two
players in private, it is still driven by market competition, which lters into the negotiation process
via outside options.
Whether or not buyers attempt to renegotiate depends on how yt compares with the list price
rb;t as well as the parameter ": The case " = 0 is straightforward: buyers opt for bargaining if they
can negotiate a better deal than the list price, i.e. if yt  rb;t: If, however, " < 0 then buyers
attempt to renegotiate only if the deal they end up getting warrants incurring the negative ", i.e.
if yt  rb;t + ". We assume that buyers bargaining power is su¢ciently large to ensure that, even
after accounting for the negative "; they would still prefer bargaining over purchasing at the posted
price. (The other scenario where they would not even attempt negotiating trivially yields a xed
price equilibrium.) Finally, if " > 0 then buyers opt for bargaining if yt  rb;t: The parameter "
is absent from this condition because the psychological satisfaction from bargaining (proxied by a
positive ") kicks in only if the item is purchased below the list price.
These conditions require the bargaining power  to be su¢ciently high, which we assume to
be the case for now. (Subsequently we will provide the necessary thresholds.) The opposite case
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where even high types are unable to negotiate a better deal is trivial as the availability of bargaining
becomes immaterial and the model collapses to a xed price setting.
2.4 Buyers Problem
Demand Distribution. In the tradition of the competitive search literature we focus on visit-
ing strategies that are symmetric and anonymous (Burdett et al., 2001; Shimer, 2005; Eeckhout
and Kircher, 2010). Symmetry requires buyers of the same type use the same visiting strategies.
Anonymity, on the other hand, means that visiting strategies ought to depend on what sellers post
but not on sellers identities i.e. sellers posting the same list price rm;t and trading with the same
pricing rule m ought to be visited with the same probability.6
Given symmetry and anonymity, the number of applications at a rm follows a Poisson dis-
tribution. To see why, and to get some intuition on how the matching process works, consider a
nite setting with B buyers and S sellers, where the buyer seller ratio equals to  = B=S. For a
moment ignore the haggler-price taker distinction and suppose that all buyers are price takers. Also
suppose that all sellers use xed pricing and post the same list price, say, r = 0:5. Since all sellers
compete with the same rule and post the same price, symmetry and anonymity in buyers visiting
strategies imply that the probability that a buyer visits a particular seller is 1=S: Consequently,
the probability that the seller gets n customers equals to
Pr [n] =

B
n

(1=S)n (1  1=S)B n ;
i.e. the seller receives customers according to a binomial distribution with parameters B and 1=S:
The expected number of customers, therefore, equals to B  1=S = : Now x  and let B and S
tend to innity (recall that we have a continuum of buyers and sellers). As the market gets large,
the binomial distribution converges to the Poisson distribution with arrival rate , that is
Pr [n] =
e n
n!
:
6 Imposing symmetry and anonymity on visiting strategies is a restriction; however these assumptions facilitate the
characterization of the equilibrium and lead to outcomes which are analytically tractable. As such, with few exceptions
the vast majority of the directed search literature restricts attention to such strategies. A notable exception is an
extension in Burdett et al. (2001) where they consider a simple 2 by 2 setup with only two buyers and two sellers
and construct equilibria supported by non symmetric strategies; however such equilibria require coordination among
buyers on who goes where. In a small market with few buyers such coordination may be possible, but in a large
market with multiple buyers and sellers such coordination is not feasible. The symmetric equilibrium requires no
coordination.
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Along this example every rm competes with xed pricing and posts the same list price, and
therefore, the expected demand at each rm equals to : (Even though the ex-ante expected
demand at each rm is , the ex-post realized demand is uncertain. A rm may well end up
getting no customer at all, or it may get more customers than it can serve.) If sellers were to post
di¤erent prices, or pick di¤erent pricing rules, then, again because of symmetry and anonymity, the
demand distribution at each rm would be still Poisson, but each with a di¤erent arrival rate that
depends on what the seller posts and how it compares with the rest of the market (Galenianos and
Kircher, 2012). For instance, if a seller posts a lower price, say 0:4; while everyone else still posts
0:5, then his expected demand q would be higher than  (more on this below).
In the full-edged model the expected demand q depends not only on the list price r; but also
on the pricing rule m; the date t and buyers type i: Specically, the probability that a rm with
the terms (rm;t;m) meets n = 0; 1; 2::: customers of type i = h; l is given by
Pr [n] =
e qi;m;t(rm;t)qni;m;t (rm;t)
n!
 zn (qi;m;t) . (2)
The fact that q is indexed by i indicates that, when thinking about the total demand at a rm,
one has to consider arrivals from high types qh;m;t as well as low types ql;m;t:
Firms post their prices and pricing rules, and buyers direct their search depending on how
attractive these terms are. All else equal, cheaper rms attract more customers and expensive
rms attract fewer customers; however price is not the only concern for a buyer when deciding
where to shop. Each seller has a limited inventory, so buyers must also take into account the
likelihood of not being able to purchase today and having to try again in the next period. In that
respect it is easier to purchase at expensive rms as they tend to be less crowded; thus, customers
do not necessarily head straight to the cheapest rm. In equilibrium, the expected demands adjust
to ensure that buyers are indi¤erent across all rms posting di¤erent prices or pricing rules.7
Expected Utilities. Let Ui;m;t denote a type i = h; l buyers expected utility at a rm trading
with rule m 2 ff; bg: Consider a xed price rm with price rf;t. We have
Ui;f;t =
P1
n=0
zn(qh;f;t+ql;f;t)
n+1 (1  rf;t) +

1 
P1
n=0
zn(qh;f;t+ql;f;t)
n+1

ui;t+1: (3)
High types and low types arrive at Poisson rates qh;f;t and ql;f;t: The distribution of the total
7Throughout the text we use "expected demand", "arrival rate" and "queue length" interchangeably.
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demand, therefore, is also Poisson with arrival rate qh;f;t + ql;f;t: So, a buyer who nds himself
at the rm nds n = 0; 1; : : : other buyers with probability zn (qh;f;t + ql;f;t). He purchases with
probability 1=(n+ 1) and his payo¤ is 1  rf;t. With the complementary probability, given by the
expression in square brackets, the buyer fails to transact so he moves to the next period, where he
expects to earn ui;t+1:
Now consider a exible rm with list price rb;t. A low type buyer always pays the list price rb;t;
so, his expected utility Ul;b;t is similar to above:
Ul;b;t =
P1
n=0
zn(qh;b;t+ql;b;t)
n+1 (1  rb;t) +

1 
P1
n=0
zn(qh;b;t+ql;b;t)
n+1

ul;t+1: (4)
A high types expected utility Uh;b;t, on the other hand, is given by
Uh;b;t = z0 (qh;b;t + ql;b;t) (1 + "  yt) +
P1
n=1
zn(qh;b;t+ql;b;t)
n+1 (1  rb;t)
+

1 
P1
n=0
zn(qh;b;t+ql;b;t)
n+1

uh;t+1:
(5)
With probability z0 (qh;b;t + ql;b;t) the high type buyer is alone at the rm, in which case he bargains
and obtains the item paying yt: Since the transaction involves bargaining, the buyer obtains the
additional ". The second part of the expression is similar to above: with probability zn (qh;b;t + ql;b;t)
he nds n = 1; 2 : : : competitors; so he purchases with probability 1=(n + 1) paying the list price
rb;t (recall that if multiple customers are present then no bargaining takes place). Finally with the
complementary probability he fails to transact and moves to period t+1, where he expects to earn
uh;t+1:
Lemma 1 We have @Ui;m;t=@rm;t < 0 and @Ui;m;t=@qi;m;t < 0, where i = h; l and m = f; b:
The proof is skipped as it is based on straightforward algebra. Put simply, the Lemma says
buyers dislike expensive or crowded rms (the ones with a high price r or high demand q). The
rst claim is self-explanatory; the second claim follows from the fact that customers are less likely
to purchase at crowded rms.
Let Ui;t denote the maximum expected utility ("market utility") a type i customer can obtain
in the market at time t. For now we treat Ui;t as given, subsequently it will be determined endoge-
nously.8 So, consider an individual seller who advertises the price package (rm;t;m) and suppose
8The market utility approach is standard in the directed search literature as it greatly facilitates the characteriza-
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high and low type buyers respond to this advertisement with arrival rates qh;m;t  0 and ql;m;t  0:
The rates satisfy
qi;m;t > 0 if Ui;m;t (rm;t; qh;m;t; ql;m;t) = Ui;t else qi;m;t = 0: (6)
The indi¤erence condition (6) says that the price package and the arrival rates must generate an
expected utility of at least Uh;t for high type customers, else they will stay away (qh;m;t = 0) and
at least Ul;t for low type customers, else they will stay away (ql;m;t = 0):
The indi¤erence condition also reveals a law of demand in that the expected demand qi;m;t
decreases as the list price rm;t increases. In words, cheaper rms attract more customers and
expensive rms attract fewer customers. To see why, apply the Implicit Function Theorem to
(6) to obtain
dqi;m;t
drm;t
=  
@Ui;m;t=@rm;t
@Ui;m;t=@qi;m;t
:
The numerator and the denominator are both negative (Lemma 1); hence dqi;m;t=drm;t is negative,
indicating that if the seller raises r then buyers respond by decreasing q. From a sellers point of
view, raising the price brings in more revenue; however it lowers the expected demand. The sellers
problem involves nding a balance between these two opposing e¤ects, which we study next.
2.5 Sellers Problem and Denition of Equilibrium
The expected prot of a xed price seller is given by
f;t = [1  z0 (qh;f;t + ql;f;t)] rf;t + z0 (qh;f;t + ql;f;t)t+1: (7)
The expression in square brackets is the probability of getting at least a customer, in which case the
item is sold at list price rf;t: With the complementary probability the seller fails to get a customer
and moves to the next period where he expects to earn t+1; which represents his discounted value
of search in period t+ 1: The expected prot of a exible seller is similar:
b;t = z0 (ql;b;t) z1 (qh;b;t) yt + [z0 (qh;b;t) z1 (ql;b;t) +
P1
n=2 zn (ql;b;t + qh;b;t)] rb;t
+z0 (ql;b;t + qh;b;t)t+1:
(8)
tion of equilibrium, e.g. see Burdett et al. (2001). Galenianos and Kircher (2012) provide game theoretic foundations
for the use of the market utility paradigm in a variety of directed search setups.
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With probability z0 (ql;b;t) z1 (qh;b;t) the seller gets a single high type customer, who haggles and
obtains the item at price yt: The expression in square brackets is the probability of getting either a
single low type customer or getting multiple customers. In either case list price rb;t is charged. The
last bit, as above, deals with the possibility of not getting any customer at all. A sellers objective
is to maximize the prot subject to the fact that he must provide buyers with their market utilities.
Specically each seller solves
max
m2ff;bg;rm;t2[0;1];(qh;m;t;ql;m;t)2R2+
m;t subject to (6). (9)
Indi¤erence constraints in (6) determine expected demands qh;m;t and ql;m;t as functions of the
pricing rule m and the list price rm;t. Note that the seller faces two indi¤erence constraints, one
for high type customers and one for low type customers. If both constraints bind, then the seller is
able to attract both types of customers. If a single constraint binds then he attracts one type only.
(The case where neither constraint binds, of course, can be ruled out as it implies that the seller
gets no customer at all.)
Sellers are free to post any price and they are also free to be xed or exible with what they
post. Letting m;t (rm;t) denote the fraction of sellers posting rm;t we have
m;t(rm;t) > 0 only if m;t(rm;t; qh;m;t; ql;m;t) = m;t else m;t (rm;t) = 0; (10)
where
m;t  max
r0m;t2[0;1];(q
0
h;m;t
;q0
l;m;t
)2R2
+
m;t(r
0
m;t; q
0
h;m;t; q
0
l;m;t):
Similarly letting 'm;t denote the fraction of sellers opting for rule m; we have
'm;t > 0 only if m;t = max
~m2ff;bg
 ~m;t; else 'm;t = 0; (11)
i.e. rule m is selected only if it delivers the highest expected prot. This does not mean that a
unique pricing rule will prevail in equilibrium. It is possible that, and indeed it is the case that,
both rules emerge in equilibrium delivering equal prots.
Finally, to close down the model, we need two feasibility conditions to ensure that the weighted
sum of expected demands (per seller) consisting of type i buyers equals to the market wide buyer-
seller ratio for that particular type. Recall that t is the total buyer-seller ratio in period t and
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that t is the fraction of low type buyers. Letting l;t  tt and h;t  (1  t)t we have
'b;t
Z 1
0
b;t(rb;t)qi;b;t(rb;t)drb;t + 'f;t
Z 1
0
f;t(rf;t)qi;f;t(rf;t)drf;t = i;t for i = h; l: (12)
There are two equations in (12), one for high types and one for low types, and the equations are
designed to take into account the possibility of each seller posting a di¤erent price. In Lemma 2,
however, we prove that sellers competing with the same rule m end up posting the same list price
rm;t; so, borrowing that result, and noting that 'f;t + 'b;t = 1; the equations in (12) become
'f;tqi;f;t + (1  'f;t)qi;b;t = i;t for i = h; l: (13)
We can now dene the equilibrium.
Denition 1 A competitive search equilibrium ("equilibrium") consists of prices rm;t; expected
demands qh;m;t; q

l;m;t and fractions 

m;t; '

m;t satisfying the demand distribution (2), buyers
indi¤erence (6), prot maximization (9), equal prots (10)-(11) and feasibility (12).
The evolution of the buyer seller ratio t and the fraction of non-hagglers t, also part of the
equilibrium, is discussed in Section 6.
3 Characterization of Equilibria: The Benchmark Case
The parameter " plays an important role in determining the nature of the equilibria. We start with
the case where " = 0; i.e. where customers are neutral to the bargaining process, i.e. they have no
displeasure or enjoyment from the bargaining process itself.
Proposition 1 Suppose " = 0: Depending on how large  is, the model exhibits two types of
equilibria:
 Partial Segmentation Equilibrium (Eq-PS): If   t  z1 (t) = [1  z0 (t)] then there
exists a continuum of payo¤-equivalent equilibria, where an indeterminate fraction 'f;t  t of
rms trade via xed pricing and remaining rms trade via exible pricing. Fixed and exible
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rms post
rf;t = 1  ut+1  
z1 (t)
1  z0 (t)
(1  ut+1   t+1) and (14)
rb;t = 1  ut+1  
z1 (t) (1  )
1  z0 (t)  z1 (t)
(1  ut+1   t+1) ; (15)
and if negotiations ensue the transaction occurs at price
yt = 1  ut+1    (1  ut+1   t+1) : (16)
Prices satisfy rb;t > r

f;t > yt; i.e. exible rms post a higher price than what xed price rms
post, which in turn, is greater than the bargained price. The inequality in prices leads to a
partial segmentation in customer demographics: non-hagglers shop exclusively at xed price
rms whereas hagglers shop anywhere. In any equilibrium sellers and buyers earn
t = 1  ut+1   [z0 (t) + z1 (t)] (1  ut+1   t+1) ; (17)
ut = z0 (t) [1  ut+1   t+1] + ut+1 (18)
 Fixed Price Equilibrium (Eq-FP): If  < t, i.e. if high type buyers are not skilled
enough in negotiations, then the availability of bargaining becomes immaterial and xed pricing
emerges as the unique equilibrium, i.e. all sellers adopt xed pricing and post rf;t; given by
(14). Equilibrium payo¤s are the same as above, i.e. sellers and buyers earn t and ut:
The main message of the Proposition is that xed and exible pricing rules can coexist in the
same marketplace; however each rule comes with its own list price and customer demographics.
Flexible rms announce higher prices and attract high types only. Fixed price rms, on the other
hand, announce lower prices and attract both types of customers.
To see why prices are unequal, note that exible stores factor in the fact that they may end
up selling at a discount, so they raise their prices to cover themselves against this contingency.
In other words, they strategically inate the sticker price anticipating the eventual surplus loss
during negotiations. Fixed price rms, on the other hand, are committed to charge what they post,
so they post moderate prices. While the relationship between exible pricing and inated sticker
prices may sound intuitive, to our knowledge, this is the rst study providing a competition based
explanation to such phenomenon with a decentralized market equilibrium approach.
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The inequality of prices raises the question of whether buyers or sellers may want to pass a
potential trading opportunity in the hope of getting a better deal in subsequent periods, and the
answer is no. In the proof of the Proposition we show that players in a match are better o¤
transacting immediately instead of walking away. There are two reasons for this. First, waiting is
costly (the discount factor is less than one), so players have a strong incentive to settle a deal as
early as possible. And more importantly, second, the market operates via search and matching,
so no-one is guaranteed to nd a suitable match in subsequent periods. A seller may not get a
customer at all, whereas a buyer may well end up in a crowded rm and walk out empty handed
as a result. Therefore, a sure transaction today, even under the worst case scenariobuying at the
highest price rb;t for a buyer, selling at the lowest price y

t for a selleris still better than walking
away and facing the prospect of not being able to buy or sell tomorrow.
4 Characterization of Equilibria when Customers Dislike Bargain-
ing
The discussion so far revolved around the case " = 0: If, on the other hand, customers dislike the
bargaining experience then the result is remarkably simple.
Proposition 2 If " < 0 then xed pricing emerges as the unique equilibrium. For characterization
see item Eq-FP in Proposition 1.
Recall that if " = 0 then xed and exible pricing are payo¤ equivalent in equilibrium and
sellers are indi¤erent to select either pricing rule. If " falls below zero then this indi¤erence no
longer holds because the negative " lters into exible sellers prots causing them to earn less
than their xed price competitors. Sellers can avoid the negative impact of " by switching to xed
pricing, which explains why the xed price outcome emerges as the unique equilibrium.
It is worth pointing out that the xed price equilibrium arises not because buyers would not
bargain anyway (because of the negative "), but because o¤ering exible pricing causes sellers to
lose on prots, and therefore, in equilibrium no venue o¤ers this option in the rst place. Indeed in
the proof of the Proposition we consider the out of equilibrium scenario where a rm o¤ers exible
pricing and we assume that high types bargaining power is su¢ciently large to ensure that, even
after accounting for the negative "; they would still prefer bargaining over purchasing at the posted
price. (The other scenario where they would not even attempt negotiating trivially yields a xed
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price outcome.) We show that along this scenario the negative " lters into the exible rms prot,
and the rm is better o¤ by unilaterally switching to xed pricing.
This nding suggests that from a sellers point of view the exible pricing strategy is not a
viable option if potential customers indeed dislike the haggling process. More specically, if sellers
realize that even potential hagglers might dislike bargaining for their products (e.g. due to the fear
of being seen unclassy) and they can not e¤ectively reduce or eliminate such displeasure, perhaps
due to product characteristics, then they have an incentive to practice xed pricing.
Finally, we turn the case where customers get a psychological satisfaction if they manage to
purchase the item below the posted price.
5 Characterization of Equilibria when Customers Enjoy Bargain-
ing
Proposition 3 Suppose " is positive but su¢ciently small:
 Full Segmentation Equilibrium (Eq-FS): If   ~t; where
~t 
z1(qh;b;t)
1 z0(qh;b;t)
 
"z1(qh;b;t)q

h;b;t
[1 z0(qh;b;t)][1 uh;t+1 t+1+"]
(19)
then there exists a unique equilibrium where a fraction 'f;t < t of rms choose xed pricing
while the rest opt for exible pricing. Equilibrium prices are given by
rf;t = 1  ul;t+1  
z1(ql;f;t)
1 z0(ql;f;t)
(1  ul;t+1   t+1) (20)
rb;t = 1  uh;t+1  
z1(qh;b;t)(1 )
1 z0(qh;b;t) z1(q

h;b;t
)
h
1  uh;t+1   t+1 + " 
q
h;b;t
"
1 
i
(21)
yt = 1  uh;t+1    (1  uh;t+1   t+1) + " (1  ) : (22)
The equilibrium is characterized by full segmentation of customers: low types avoid exible
rms and high types avoid xed price rms. Expected demands satisfy qh;b;t <  < q

l;f;t; i.e.
exible rms attract fewer customers than xed price rms: Equilibrium payo¤s are as follows
t = 1  ul;t+1   [z0(q

l;f;t) + z1(q

l;f;t)] (1  ul;t+1   t+1) (23)
uh;t = z0(q

h;b;t) (1  uh;t+1   t+1) + [z0(q

h;b;t)  z1(q

h;b;t)]"+ uh;t+1 (24)
ul;t = z0(q

l;f;t)[1  ul;t+1   t+1] + ul;t+1 (25)
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 Fixed Price Equilibrium (Eq-FP): If  < ~t then xed pricing emerges as the unique
equilibrium. For characterization see item Eq-FP in Proposition 1.
When compared to the benchmark case " = 0; the introduction of a positive " leads to two
important results: uniqueness of the equilibrium, instead of a continuum of equilibria, and full
segmentation of customers, instead of partial segmentation. The multiplicity of equilibria in the
benchmark case is disturbing for two reasons. First, the model loses predictive power as one cannot
know how many rms are rm with the price and how many are exible. Second, and perhaps
more worrisome, is the presence of an equilibrium where the fraction of xed price sellers 'f;t may,
in fact, be equal to 1, i.e. a xed price outcome where no seller o¤ers exible pricing, despite the
availability of bargaining and despite the fact that high types are su¢ciently skilled in negotiations.
The introduction of a positive " eliminates the continuum of equilibria, and instead, yields a unique
equilibrium. To understand why, notice that in the benchmark if su¢ciently many sellers pick xed
pricing, then the marginal seller is indi¤erent between picking either pricing rule, which is why there
is a continuum of equilibria where 'f;t can be anywhere between t and 1. But if " > 0 then the
marginal seller is strictly better o¤ picking exible pricing, because, compared to the benchmark,
buyers have a larger appetite for exible deals, yet there are not su¢ciently many sellers o¤ering
such deals. The marginal seller can earn more if he deviates to exible pricing, which explains why
the introduction of a positive " unsettles the aforementioned indi¤erence and leads to a unique
equilibrium.
The equilibrium is characterized by full segmentation of customers: low types avoid exible
rms whereas high types avoid xed price rms. The reason behind the rst relationship is the
same as in the benchmark: exible rms post negotiable but high prices, but non-hagglers cannot
negotiate; hence they avoid these rms. The second relationship is due to the positive ": In the
benchmark model high types were indi¤erent between xed and exible rms, so they would shop
anywhere. The introduction of " unsettles this indi¤erence in favor of exible venues because in
this setting high types not only are able to bargain down the list price but also get some additional
satisfaction from doing so.9
9Proposition 3 requires " to be positive but small. If " is large, then there exists a corner equilibrium, where
all sellers choose exible pricing and low type buyers have no choice but to shop at these stores and pay inated
list prices. We do not focus on this outcome, because " is assumed to be a small psychological factor, whereas this
outcome requires " to be so large to convince all sellers to ignore low types in order to lure the more lucrative high
types.
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In our model we a-priori classify buyers as hagglers and non-hagglers, and then, obtain the
segmentation result along those lines (hagglers to exible stores vs. non-hagglers to xed price
stores). Thus, it may seem that the exogenous classication of buyers in terms of their bargaining
abilities is necessary for the segmentation result; but this is not the case. Consider a scenario where
buyers are identical in terms of their bargaining skills but di¤er in terms of their enjoyment for the
bargaining experience, proxied by the parameter ": Imagine that " varies in an interval ["1; "N ],
where "1 < 0 and "N > 0; and that buyers are divided into N separate groups, where group 1 has
the lowest " and group N has the highest, that is "1 < "2 < ::: < "N : We show that if the gap
between "N and "N 1 is su¢ciently large, then there exists an equilibrium, where bargaining deals
are designated for the most enthusiastic type onlythat is, in equilibrium type N customers hunt
for bargaining deals and shop at exible stores, while everyone else shops at xed price stores. This
outcome is similar to Eq-FS in that it generates segmentation among customers. In addition, along
this variation the division of hagglers vs. non-hagglers emerges as an endogenous phenomenon, in
that type N customers turn into hagglers whereas remaining customers do not haggle at all. (The
proof of this result can be found in the Online Appendix 2.)
The result on self selection and segmentation is indeed important as it shows that the type of
demand a rm gets strategically depends on the pricing rule it selects at the rst place. As indicated
in the Introduction, most of the existing literature in pricing strategies assume a non-competitive
environment, typically a monopolist seller, where heterogenous customers (myopic, strategic etc.)
are assumed to arrive at an exogenous rate and irrespective of the pricing rule in place. Our result,
however, suggests that if the exogenous demand assumption is relaxed then due to self-selection
some customers may not visit certain rms in the rst place.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that customers indeed love the feeling of purchasing the item below
the posted price and that they inevitably gravitate towards outlets o¤ering such deals. Retail giant
JC Penney made a bold move in January 2012 by ridding their stores of all discounts, sales and
bargains in an e¤ort to establish "fair and square" pricing. Unfortunately, for JC Penney, this
strategy did not work as its core consumers, who were accustomed to sales and bargains, began
leaving the retailer in droves. At the end, the now ousted CEO Ron Johnson had to confess this
(Tuttle, 2013):
I thought people were just tired of coupons and all this stu¤. The reality is all of
the couponing we did, there were a certain part of the customers that loved that. They
gravitated to stores that competed that way. So our core customer, I think was much
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more dependent, and enjoyed coupons more than I understood.
While this example illustrates how customers enjoyment of the selling institution itself may
have signicant implications, we note that enjoyment of coupons is not the same as enjoyment of
bargaining. There are apparent di¤erences between the two cases including the rules, deadlines,
contexts and specic processes associated with coupons. However despite these di¤erences, one
can identify broad similarities between coupons and bargaining. First, in both cases, customers
who are willing to exert e¤ort (either by engaging in haggling or by being diligent enough to
monitor deals from Hi/Lo retailers) may get rewarded with lower prices. Second, in both cases,
even with additional e¤ort, obtaining a deal is not guaranteed with limited availability items (as
demand may rise endogenously depending on the appeal of the pricing/promotion policy). Third,
customers may possibly gain additional non-economic pleasure with feelings of excitement, mastery
and competence from getting discounts via coupons or bargaining.
To understand how equilibrium objects change with respect to " we simulate prices and the
fraction of rms adopting exible pricing against " and calendar time t. The simulations are based
on a stationary environment where outgoing agents are assumed to be replaced with clones; thus
t, bt and st remain constant throughout all market activity: The stationarity of the environment
ensures that the observed dynamics do not stem from uctuations in the number or composition
of buyers and sellers.10
Price trajectories in 1a and 1b reveal that for any given t; the equilibrium xed price and the
exible list price both increase in "; implying that sellers take advantage of the positive utility
enjoyed by hagglers in the form of higher prices. Remarkably xed price sellers, who do not even
cater to hagglers, also raise their prices if " goes up. The mechanism behind this spillover e¤ect is
this. As " goes up, more rms o¤er exible pricing (see panel 1c) and fewer rms o¤er xed pricing.
Since xed price rms are the only outlets where non-hagglers can shop, the expected demand at
xed price rms goes up. The rising demand, naturally, leads to higher prices. The fact that xed
price rms get more crowded and charge higher prices points to another interesting spillover e¤ect
in that non-bargaining customers, who shop only at xed price rms, end up receiving less utility
10The simulations are based on the following parametrization: b1 = s1 = 1; 1 = 0:5,  = 0:6, T = 25 and  = 0:9.
The terminal payo¤s, uT+1 and T+1, are both assumed to be zero. The parameter " ranges from 0 to 0:05.
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when haggling customers enjoy bargaining.11
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1c: Fraction of Flexible Stores
Figure 1: Equilibrium Market Dynamics against t and "
A variety of markets operate on implicit or explicit deadlines, and those deadlines inevitably have
a bearing on price dynamics. In our model, the simulations are based on a setting with a nite
T , which allows us to study such deadline e¤ects on prices and the percentage of sellers adopting
each pricing rule. Price trajectories with respect to the calendar time t reveal that if the deadline
is su¢ciently far away (i.e. when t is small) then sellers list higher prices. As the deadline nears,
however, prices start to fall. The pattern is more visible for larger values of ": Indeed, if "  0
then prices remain rather at over time, however if "  0:05 then they clearly exhibit a falling
pattern. The reason is this. When t is small, sellers are not worried about not being able to trade
as they know the market will remain active for a long while. So, they list higher prices in order to
take advantage of the presence of high type buyers and benet from the positive " they bring with.
Towards the end of the market however, the fear of not being able to sell and walking out empty
handed kicks in, as such, prices start to fall.12 Notice that, the drop in prices is only gradual and
it does not warrant buyers to delay their purchase. As discussed earlier, in equilibrium, players
11We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out the second relationship between " and its impact on the non-
bargaining customers utility.
12 In Figure 1a, taking " = 0 as a benchmark, we observe that exible sellers add a premium to their prices as " goes
up and during the initial periods this premium can exceed ". To see why, recall that customers pay this full price only
with some positive probability. With the remainder probability, they negotiate and pay a lower price plus they enjoy
" on top. Thus, on expected terms they are still better o¤ compared to the benchmark even though the premium may
exceed ": The premium is highest during the initial periods, because, early on, many stores o¤er exible pricing, and
the higher the number of such stores, the less crowded they are. This, in turn, means that their customers are very
likely to negotiate a discount. To cover themselves against such likely discounts, the stores raise the aforementioned
premium. As the deadline approaches the number of exible stores decreases; thus, the premium starts to shrink.
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are better o¤ trading immediately rather than waiting. The deadline e¤ect can be augmented by
considering imbalances in terminal payo¤s of buyers and sellers: Suppose, for instance, that sellers
have the option to liquidate unsold items in a secondary market that starts at the end of the rst
market, i.e. suppose that T+1 > 0 (buyers terminal payo¤ is still uT+1 = 0). Along this scenario,
the payo¤ T+1 lters into the prices and prevents them from falling too much even when the
deadline is near.
Another observation is that the equilibrium percentage of sellers adopting exible pricing falls
in t (panel 1c). To see why, notice that along Eq-FS exible stores attract, on average, fewer
customers than xed price stores; thus, they are less likely to make a sale. Initially sellers are not
too worried about not being able to trade, so a large number of them remain exible in an e¤ort
to trade with high type customers. But as t grows large, sellers start to switch to xed pricing to
maximize their likelihood of making a sale.
Panel 1c further reveals that the percentage of sellers adopting exible pricing rises in ": The
intuition is that exible sellers are able to convert a larger " into higher prices, and thereby, into
higher prots. The market is competitive; so, if " rises then more sellers become exible in an
e¤ort to take advantage of this opportunity. The next proposition summarizes the discussion above
analytically. (The proof is in the Online Appendix 1.)
Proposition 4 The equilibrium prot t rises in ":
In order to prove the proposition, we start by establishing that the expected utility of low types,
ul;t, falls in ". In words, low type (non-bargaining) customers, who shop only at xed price rms,
end up receiving less utility when haggling customers " increases. Recall that we have seen this
spillover e¤ect in the simulations above. In the proof of the proposition, we establish this result
analytically. Next, we show that sellers prot increases as ul;t decreases, thus the result in the
proposition follows.
The proposition suggests that sellers may convert a positive " into higher prices and prots.
This, then, indicates that rms attempt to raise customers enjoyment of the bargaining process
(e.g. through such actions as better training of the salesforce to be highly courteous during bar-
gaining, providing a relaxing environment for price negotiation, among others) may be a protable
strategy.
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6 Price Dynamics
In this section we explore how equilibrium prices respond to uctuations in expected demand. We
proxy the expected demand by the buyer-seller ratio t = bt=st since along Eq-PS and Eq-FP the
expected demand at each store is equal to t; whereas along Eq-FS expected demands q

h;b;t and
ql;f;t are proportional to it (they increase if t increases and they fall if it falls).
To determine the trajectory of t one needs to focus on how the measures of buyers and sellers
evolve over time. Recall that the market starts with a measure of s1 sellers and b1 buyers, of which
a fraction 1 are low types. At the end of each period, trading players leave the market and the
ones who could not trade move to the next period to play the same game. In addition, at the
beginning of each period t = 2; 3::: a new cohort of snewt sellers and b
new
t buyers, of which a fraction
newt are low types, enter the market joining the existing players. The proposition below pins down
how these measures evolve over time.
Proposition 5 Along Eq-PS and Eq-FP the measures of buyers and sellers evolve according to
bt = b
new
t + bt 1   st 1(1  z0 (t 1)) and st = s
new
t + st 1z0 (t 1) for t  2: (26)
The fraction of non-hagglers, on the other hand, evolves according to
t = [b
new
t 
new
t + bt 1t 1   t 1st 1(1  z0 (t))]=bt: (27)
Specically if newt = 1 then t = 1 for all t  2: Along Eq-FS we have
bt = b
new
t + bt 1   (lt 1 + ht 1) and st = s
new
t + st 1   (lt 1 + ht 1)
where lt 1  st 1'

f;t 1[1   z0(q

f;t 1)] and ht 1  st 1(1   '

f;t 1)[1   z0(q

h;t 1)]. The fraction of
non-hagglers evolves according to t = [bt 1t 1   lt 1 + 
new
t b
new
t ]=bt:
Given the equations governing bt and st, one can pin down how t evolves over time and then,
via reverse engineering, one can impose specic trajectories on t. To see how, note that along
Eq-PS or Eq-FP we have
t =
bnewt + bt 1   st 1(1  e
 t 1)
snewt + st 1e
 t 1
for t  2: (28)
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The trajectory is endogenous but it is partly driven by the measures of incoming cohorts bnewt
and snewt , which are exogenous. This means that one can reverse engineer and pick the exogenous
numbers in such a way that the trajectory follows a particular pattern one may have in mind.
Specically, we consider seasonal cycles where t starts low in the beginning of the cycle, peaks in
the middle of the cycle and subsides towards the end of the cycle and each such cycle lasts, say, k
periods, that is t = t+k; for some integer k: For instance consider a case with k = 2, where the
market alternates between episodes of high and low demand. Suppose in odd periods we want to
have odd = 0:5 and in even periods even = 1: One can produce such cycles by picking starting
values, say, b1 = 1 and s1 = 2 and the new entrants as b
new
t=even = 1:7; s
new
t=even = 0:7; b
new
t=odd = 0:3
and snewt=odd = 1:3:
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Figure 2: Price Dynamics in a Market with Seasonal Cycles
In the simulation we pick k = 12 and select the entering cohorts in such a way that the expected
13 In period 1 the buyer seller ratio equals to 1 = b1=s1 = 0:5: At the end of the period s1
 
1  e 1

= 0:8 buyers
and sellers trade and exit, which means that a measure of 1.2 sellers and 0.2 buyers are unable to trade so they move
to the next period. At the beginning of period 2, bnewt=even = 1:7; s
new
t=even = 0:7 enter the market; thus b2 = s2 = 1:9
and therefore 2 = 1: At the end of period 2, s2
 
1  e 2

= 1:2 buyers and sellers trade and exit; hence a measure
0.7 sellers and 0.7 buyers move to period 3. At the beggining of period 3, bnewt=odd = 0:3; s
new
t=odd = 1:3 join them; thus
b3 = 1 and s3 = 2 and therefore 3 = 0:5: And so on.
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demand follows a zigzag trajectory: the cycle starts when lambda is at its lowest value 0.6, then
it peaks at 2 in the middle of the season, then it declines back to 0.6 and then it starts again (see
Figure 2). In addition, for the sake of simplicity we assume that newt = 1 = 0:5 so that t remains
constant at 0:5 at all times.14
There are a few observations that stand out. First, prices seem to follow the same trajectory
as the expected demand t: they rise as t rises and they fall as it falls. The intuition is simple. If
t goes up then sellers face less competition to attract customers, so they post higher prices. If t
falls then they face sti¤er competition and cut their prices.
Second, the simulation conrms that the exible list price is indeed higher than the xed price.
As discussed earlier, exible sellers understand that they may well end up selling at a lower price
than what they initially post, so they inate the list price up-front to cover themselves against this
contingency.
Third, there is a time lag between prices and the expected demandprices seem to front-run the
expected demand by about two periods. Indeed, prices peak around t = 5, whereas the expected
demand peaks at t = 7. Similarly, prices dip at around t = 11, which, again, is well before t
reaches its own minimum at t = 13. To understand why, note that prices depend not only on the
current demand, but on the entire sequence ft+jg
T
j=0, as such, if the general outlook of future
demand turns negative, then prices start to fall even if demand keeps rising for a short while. For
instance at t = 6 sellers understand that demand will rise only for one more period, after which it
will fall for six consecutive periods until t = 13; so, they start cutting prices. By the time t peaks
at t = 7 prices have already started falling. The opposite happens at the end of the cycle. By the
time the demand dips at t = 13; prices have already started rising. (We remind the reader that
players, due to trade frictions, are always willing to transact immediately rather than waiting.)
The nal observation is that prices do not uctuate as much as the expected demand. Even
though the demand goes through sharp zigzags, prices follow much smoother trajectories with little
uctuation15. The reason is this. Prices depend on the entire demand sequence ft+jg
T
j=0 and if
14Note that in Eq-PS if newt = 1 then t = 1 for all t: In words, the fraction of low types remains constant at 1
throughout all market activity, provided that the fraction in the entrant cohorts is also 1: (This relationship holds in
Eq-FP as well, but this is rather immaterial because no one negotiates in Eq-FP.) To see why note that along Eq-PS
the expected demand at all rms is equal to t; thus all buyers trade and exit at the same rate. This means that the
ratio of hagglers to non hagglers is not disturbed by how fast di¤erent types of buyers exit the market. If this ratio
is not disturbed externally either, then t remains constant at 1 for all t  2: This relationship does not hold along
Eq-FS because in that equilibrium hagglers are more likely to trade than non hagglers, and they exit the market at
a faster rate. Simulations suggest that if we x newt = 1 then t converges to a level slightly above 1:
15 In the simulation, the maximum value of t is more than three times its minimum value, but for prices this ratio
is less than 1.5. Similarly, the coe¢cient of variation for t is 0.32, whereas for prices it is less than 0.1.
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the terminal period T is su¢ciently far away then sellers e¤ectively face a market with cyclical
demand that goes through periodic ups and downs. (In the simulation we have T = 360; which
means that the market goes through thirty cycles of twelve periods before it comes to an end.) With
cyclical demand, if  is su¢ciently large then future total demand is more or less constant because
the variation in demand is mostly accounted for; hence prices do not uctuate as much. Indeed
as  ! 1 price trajectories converge to each other and they start to look like at lines. On the
other hand, as  ! 0 the impact of any lambda beyond, say, the current period becomes ignorable,
which leaves the current demand t as the dominant factor driving the prices. Consequently, price
trajectories start to follow the trajectory of the current demand t closely, exhibiting a similar
zigzag pattern.16
The parameter  (inversely) proxies the severity of trade frictions. A small value of  indicates
that players who are unable to buy or sell today incur signicant waiting costs before trying again
in the subsequent period. The discussion above suggests that uctuations in prices depend on the
degree of trade frictions. If trade frictions are severe (i.e. if waiting is costly) then prices move
signicantly; else, they remain stable even though the demand goes through sharp ups and downs.
In the simulation we have  = 0:8; which is a moderately high value; hence the stable prices. The
following proposition summarizes the discussion so far (the proof is in the Online Appendix 1).17
Proposition 6 Both in Eq-PS an in Eq-FP if T is su¢ciently large then for all 1 < t  T we
have
lim
!1
yt = lim
!1
rb;t = lim
!1
rf;t = 0,
where yt  y

t   y

t 1 denotes the di¤erence in prices (r

b;t and r

f;t are likewise).
In marketing, the phenomenon of stable prices in the presence of uctuating demand and
supply is predominantly explained with fairness concerns, which originates from the principle of
dual entitlement put forward by Kahneman et al. (1986). This principle suggests, among others,
that customers have perceived fairness levels for both rm prots and retail prices, and it is not fair
for retailers to change the price arbitrarily, or just to increase the rms existing prot, for example,
by taking advantage of excess demand (Xia et al., 2004; Bolton et al., 2003; Anderson and Simester,
2008). In addition, the fact that prices are not that responsive to changes in costs or demand has
16We thank the AE for pointing out the interplay between the cyclicality of demand and stable prices.
17We restrict the Proposition within Eq-PS and Eq-FP because in the other equilibrium (Eq-FS) expected demands
qh;b;t and q

l;f;t have non-trivial closed form solutions rendering an analytic proof elusive. Numerical simulations,
however, suggest that along Eq-FS, too, prices tend to remain stable if  and T are large.
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also been analyzed in the economics literature by highlighting, inter alia, the role of consumers loss
aversion (Heidhues and K½oszegi, 2008), the risk of antagonizing customers (Anderson and Simester,
2010), or menu costs. While fairness concerns, or the fear of antagonizing customers could be drivers
of price stability in many markets, our results suggest that the phenomenon of stable prices can be
obtained as a result of market competition with forward looking rational players.
A second distinction of our paper is that, unlike the cited literature, which by default assume
xed pricing, price stability in our model obtains even when the selection of the pricing rule is
endogenous, and where the sale price may involve a non-trivial bargaining process. While forward
looking agents may facilitate smooth prices, it is not obvious whether (and under what pricing
rules) the smooth price phenomenon would emerge if sellers were allowed to trade via alternative
pricing rules. Our paper demonstrates that all pricesthe xed price, the exible list prices and
the bargained priceremain stable despite the uctuating demand.
Admittedly, the phenomenon of stable prices may emerge in alternative settings with forward
looking customers and market competition, e.g., the aforecited literature studying pricing mecha-
nism selection (Eeckhout and Kircher, 2010; Virag, 2011). One can potentially obtain stable prices
if one constructs dynamic versions of these models, however, their static (one-shot) setups do not
allow them to investigate the issue of price stability. In contrast, our paper considers a dynamic
framework, which enables us to explore the issue of price stability in detail.
Many real world markets exhibit cyclical or seasonal demand patterns (Radas and Shugan,
1998; Gijsenberg, 2017), where periods of higher demand follow periods of lower demand. Recent
empirical research in marketing has documented such demand patterns and also examined the
evolution of observed prices along such cycles (Gijsenberg, 2017). A notable nding therein is the
relative stability of prices over time and the limited inuence of the demand cycles on the observed
prices. While their study context (consumer packaged goods) is clearly di¤erent than ours, the
observation appears to be quite similar to the price stability phenomenon we observe in our study. In
addition, anecdotal evidence suggests that markets that are known for signicant seasonal/cyclical
demand uctuations, such as the housing market, exhibit surprisingly stable prices, which fall quite
slowly during low-demand periods (so the average time of a house on the market substantially
increases) and do not increase as swiftly and signicantly as one would expect during high-demand
periods. Our results may provide a compelling reason for these observations in that the variation in
future demand gets to be largely accounted for in current prices, so, prices do not uctuate much.
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7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we develop economic intuition on the selection and dynamics of two popular pricing
rulesxed price and exible priceusing the competitive search paradigm. Fixed pricing is plain
enough; exible pricing involves bargaining between the buyer and seller. Despite bargaining being
a common practice in many buying-selling situations, previous analytical models of bargaining in
marketing have mostly focused on business-to-business and channel relationships (Iyer and Villas-
Boas, 2003; Dukes et al., 2006; Guo and Iyer, 2013), leaving room for models investigating the
practice of bargaining by customers. In addition, non-economic dynamics such as pleasure or
displeasure associated with bargaining could play a role during such transactions. As such, our
modeling approach attempts to incorporate this additional non-economic element into the model.
As xed and exible pricing coexist in many modern day markets, it is important to gain a
better conceptual understanding of these pricing strategies. In this paper, we provide a theoret-
ical rationale for rms selection and strategic implications of xed and exible pricing in a fully
competitive setting by focusing on decentralized markets such as housing or used cars. Fixed and
exible pricing formats, of course, are not exclusive to these markets, and they coexist in a variety
of marketplaces. For example in many classied advertisement websites such as Craigslist, one
observes indicators for both exible price selling (OBOor best o¤er) and xed price selling (e.g.,
"sharp price") for seemingly similar items. Similarly, on eBay, in addition to the auction setup,
individuals typically have two other options to sell the product: (i) using a xed price (Buy It
Now) or (ii) using a exible price option, under which the seller can either accept the o¤er, decline
it, or respond with a counter o¤er.
Our study has also connections to research on everyday low pricing (EDLP) and promotional
(Hi/Lo) pricing strategies employed by retailers (Lal and Rao, 1997; Ho et al., 1998; Ellickson and
Misra, 2008). Fixed pricing resembles EDLP, and exible pricing resembles Hi/Lo pricing in some
ways. As such, our setting has some distinctions and similarities with EDLP and promotional
pricing. The di¤erences include the focus on buyers shopping for a single item in our case, whereas
customers shopping for a set of items or product categories in EDLP and Hi/Lo research. Also,
while search and trade frictions play an essential role in our model, these are typically small or
negligible for EDLP and Hi/Lo settings.
Despite these di¤erences, there are some noteworthy similarities. First, both in Hi/Lo settings
and in our model, there is uncertainty pertaining the price. More specically, we have ex-ante
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price uncertainty in our model in that customers do not know whether they will get an opportunity
to negotiate with the seller before visiting the stores. (We do not have ex-post price uncertainty,
i.e., once customers arrive at stores, there is no uncertainty regarding the sale price). Such ex-
ante price uncertainty is somewhat similar to promotions at local Hi/Lo sellers where customers
may not be aware of those promotions before actually visiting the stores. A similar ex-ante price
uncertainty in Hi/Lo stores is that demand can endogenously rise as a result of the appeal of the
coupons/promotions, therefore, as in our model, there is no guarantee for a prospective customer
to obtain a deal if the item has limited availability.
Furthermore, there seems to be a broad correspondence between our model of xed vs. exible
pricing and EDLP vs. Hi/Lo pricing in terms of the role of consumer dynamics. In both cases,
consumers heterogeneity (e.g., some customers put additional e¤ort by engaging in bargaining or
by closely monitoring promotions, whereas others do no exert e¤ort) as well as their non-economic
aspects (e.g., enjoyment from bargaining) may have signicant implications for sellers choice of
pricing policies.
Finally, our article provides an important methodological contribution to the pricing literature in
marketing in that, in addition to Bertrand, Cournot, or Hotelling frameworks, our study underlines
the competitive search approach as an alternative way of capturing competition. The competitive
search approach is particularly suitable to model the pricing problem in decentralized markets
where search and trade frictions matter. Overall, we think that incorporating competitive search
models into marketing problems could open up a new avenue of research for scholars in this area.
Our paper has several limitations. First, we implicitly assume that sellers can commit to a
pricing rule and implement it without any costs. However, sellers may nd it di¢cult to commit
to a xed price policy in markets where bargaining is widespread. A second issue pertains to the
enjoyment of bargaining, proxied by a positive ", which may be di¢cult to justify. This is because
even if there is a non-economic benet of bargaining beyond the tangible benet of obtaining a
lower price, it is not clear if it is a rst order e¤ect. Furthermore, we take the positive " as given
while remaining agnostic about the factors, psychological or otherwise, generating itand explore
sellers pricing and buyers visiting decisions in the presence of such a parameter. If such factors
are explicitly accounted for, then they may interact with other components of the model and lead
to non-trivial results. Therefore, the results regarding the positive " should be taken with caution.
Overall, while we recognize that our model is stylized and some of our modeling assumptions may
not apply to broader markets or product categories, we believe our paper is an important step
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towards a better understanding of xed and exible selling strategies.
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